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There has been considerable interest in querying encrypted data,
allowing a "secure database server" model where the server does not
know data values. This paper shows how results from cryptography
prove the impossibility of developing a server that meets cryptographic-
style definitions of security and is still efficient enough to be practi~
cal. The weaker definitions of security supported by previous secure
database server proposals have the potential to reveal significant in-
formation. We propose a definition of a secure database server that
provides probabilistic security guarantees, and sketch how a practi-
cal system meeting the definition could be built and proven secure.
The primary goal of this paper is to provide a vision of how research
in this area should proceed: efficient encrypted database and query
processing with provable security properties.
1 Introduction
There has been considerable interest in the notion of a "secure database
service": A Database Management System that could that could manage
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a database without knowing the contents[ll]. While the business model is
compelling, it is important that such a system be provably secure. Existing
proposals have problems in this respect; the security provided leaves room
for information leaks.
Any method for database encryption that does not meet rigorous cryptography-
based standards security must be used carefully. For example, methods that
quantize or "bin" values [11] reveal data distributions. Methods that hide dis-
tribution, but preserve order [31, can also disclose information if used naIvely.
While they may effectively hide values in isolation, using such techniques OIl
multiple attributes in a tuple can pose dangers. We provide more discussion
of the successes and potential pitfalls of related work in Section 6; we now
give an example of how naIve use of prior proposals can disclose sensitive
information.
Suppose a bank is trying to find who is responsible for missing money
(e.g., fraud or embezzlement). They have gathered information on suspect
employees and customers. Even though much of the information is publicly
known (name, size of mortgage, age, postal code, ... ), simply revealing who
is being investigated is sensitive: The appearance that you arc accusing a
customer of fraud could well lead to a libel suit. Therefore they have en-
crypted each of the values using an order-preserving encryption scheme. Are
they protected?
The answer is probably not. Assume a newspaper wants to know if an in-
dividual "Chris" is being investigated. They obtain the encrypted database.
They know that the name "Chris" would rank at about 15% of all names -
so if it appears in the encrypted database, it will be roughly in that position
(the range for a given sample size and probability can be calculated using
order statistics). The newspaper can do the same with size of mortgage, age,
and other known data about Chris - and with the other employees/customers
of the bank. If there is a tuple in the database whose rank on all attributes is
close to the corresponding rank of Chris (in the overall dataset), and there is
no other tuple among the customers/employees whose ranks are similar, then
the newspaper knows that with high probability, Chris is under investigation.
The key problem is that while encrypting a single value using order pre-
serving encryption or a binning scheme may reveal little information, sup-
porting multiple index keys for each tuple reveals a surprising amount. To
protect against such naIve misuse of order-preserving, homomorphic, or other
such encryption techniques, we propose definitions for what it means for an
encrypted database to be Secure.
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This paper presents a vision for how research enabling a secure database
service should proceed: Establish solid definitions of "secure", develop en-
cryption and query processing techniques that meet those definitions, demon-
strate that such techniques have practical promise. We start with definitions
of security from the Cryptography community that have withstood the test
of time. To what extent can we apply these definitions to a "secure DBMSJl ,
enabling a proof of security? Section 3 gives security definitions for database
and query indistinguishability based on the cryptographic concept of message
indistinguishability. This leads to a troubling result: prior work in cryptog-
raphy shows that a secure DBMS server meeting these definitions requires
that the cost of every query be linear in the size of the database, making a
secure DBMS impractical for real~world use.
Section 4 begins the real contribution of this paper: a slightly relaxed
definition that gives probabilistic guarantees of security. For the data itself,
security is equivalent to strong cryptographic definitions. An adversary trac-
ing query execution could conceivably infer information over many queries,
but the quality of the information decays exponentially - by the time enough
queries have been seen to infer anything sensitive, the relationship between
the early and later queries will have been broken, so the adversary will be
unable to infer sensitive data.
In Section 4.2 we show that for this definition, a secure DBMS server
with reasonable performance could be constructed. The one caveat is that
it requires the existence of a secure execution module: a way of running
programs on the server that are hidden from the server. We show how basic
query processing operations (select, join, indexed search) can be implemented
with a simple secure execution module supporting encryption, decryption,
pseudo-random number generation, and comparison; and give sketches of how
the operations could be proven to meet our definition of security. This paper
addresses read-only queries (select-project-join); extension to insert/update
is reasonable, but beyond the scope of the current work.
How do we get such a secure execution model? Program obfuscation, pro-
viding a program whose execution reveals no information to the server, has
been proven impossible for several classes of program[6]. We provide evi-
dence that if possible at all it is unlikely to be efficient for a secure DBMS.
Fortunately, there is another solution, implementing the secure execution
module in tamper-proof hardware. Such hardware exists; one example meet-
ing our requirements is IBM's [12]. Section 5 shows how to use such a module
to implement a system safe from software-driven attacks; the specifications
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and evaluation of the hardware tell us the protection provided against elec-
tronic/physical attacks.
2 Background and Definitions from Cryptog-
raphy
The cryptography community has developed solid and well-regarded defini-
tions for securely encrypting a message. The result of this research is that
secure encryption should hide any partial information about the data: one
should not be able to distinguish between encryptions of two different mes-
sages of the same length. Consider the following scenario where a stock trader
sends buy or sell messages for a particular stock. An adversary knows mes-
sages are either buy or sell, but indistinguishability guarantees the adversary
will have no clue which one was sent.
A formal definition of indistinguishable private key encryption, from [8],
IS:
Definition 2.1 Indistinguishability of encryptions[8}
An encryption scheme with efficient key generation algorithm G I efficient
encryption algorithm E and decryption algorithm D where DdE k (x)) = X
for secret key k has indistinguishable private key encryption if for every
polynomial-size circuit family {en} I every polynomial P, all sufficiently large
n and every a, b E 0, IPoly(n) with equal length.
IPr{Cn(Ec{]O)(a)) = I}-
I
Pr{Cn(EC{],,)(b)) = I}I < p(n)
The probability in the above terms is taken over the internal coin tosses of
algorithms G and E.
Intuitively the definition states that any adversary with computing power
comparable to the polynomial-size circuit family will not be able to predict
whether a given ciphertext is the encrypted form of a or b significantly better
than a random guess.
The same key is often used to encrypt many messages. The preceding
definition ensures that no two messages can be distinguished, but it does
allow the distribution of messages to be learned (e.g., an adversary could
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learn that 75% of orders were of one type and 25% were the other, even if
it didn't know which was buy and which was sell.) For multiple message,
the cryptography community has a definition that ensures that even the
distributions are not revealed. The formal definition from [8] is:
Definition 2.2 Indistinguishability of encryptions: multiple-message case[8]
An encryption scheme with efficient key generation algorithm G, efficient en-
cryption algorithm E and decryption algorithm D where Dk(Ek(x)) = x for
secret key k has multi-message indistinguishable private key encryption if
for every polynomial-size circuit family {en}, every polynomial p, all suffi-
ciently large n and even) a = (aI, a2, ... ,aL(n») , b = (bl , b2, ... ,bl(n)) where
iI, b E 0, IPoly(n), following inequality holds
where EC(l")(ii) is defined as
(EC(l")(a,), EC(l,,)(a,), ... , EC(l")(an ))
Any encryption scheme that satisfies the above definition will hide the dis-
tribution of the transmitted encrypted messages. Our definition of securely
encrypting a database is based on these definitions. The first captures gen~
eral database encryption, the second is applicable to encryption of individual
tuples or field values.
Fortunately, the cryptography community has a method for extending
many ciphers providing message indistinguishability to provide multi-message
indistinguishability. The counter-based CTR encryption mode given in Al-
gorithm 1 enables a block cipher meeting Definition 2.1 to meet 2.2. (It also
supports encryption where the block size exceeds that of the block cipher.)
The idea is to choose a unique number (counter) for each block, and encrypt
that unique number. The resulting encryption is then xor-ed with the actual
message block. The encrypted message consists of the counter (in plain text),
and the message. Assuming the underlying block cipher is a pseudo-random
permutation (DES is presumed to be such a permutation), this method sat-
isfies Definition 2.2. The key idea is that two identical messages (or identical
blocks in a message) will be xor-ed with different values, since the masking
encryption will be from a different counter.
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Algorithm 1 Counter-based CTR mode Encryption
Encryption:
Require: plain text x and initial counter value C.
Divide x into n k-bit blocks
for i=l to n do
y,= Ek(C+i) EBx,
end for
return (C, YIY2 ... Yn)
Decryption:
Require: ciphertext Y = (C, YIY2 ... Yn)
for i=l to n do
x, ~ Ek(C +i) <'Ely,
end for
return(xlx2'" xn )
3 Implausibility of a Fully Secure Database
Server
Encryption schemes are defined to be secure if and only if the ciphertext re-
veals no information about the plaintext. We now use the security definitions
from cryptography to define what it means to "securely" encrypt a database
table and securely query the encrypted data.
3.1 Security Definitions for Encrypted Database Ta-
bles
As mentioned above, given any two pairs of ciphertexts and plaintexts of
the same length, it must be infeasible to figure out which ciphertext goes
with which plaintext. This means that any two database tables with the
same schema and the same number of tuples must have indistinguishable
encryptions. To be more precise, we now give a database-specific adaptation
of the definitions stated in Section 2.
Definition 3.1 An encryption scheme (G, E, D) for database tables; con-
sisting of key genemtion scheme G, encryption function E, and decryption
junction D J' has indistinguishable encryptions if for every polynomial-size
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circuit family {Cn }, every polynomial p, and all sufficiently large n, every
database R1 and R 2 E {O,I}poly(n) with the same schema and the same num-
ber of tuples (i.e., IRd ~ IR,I):
IPr{Cn(Ec(1")(R1)) = I}-
I
Pr{Cn(Ec(1")(R,)) = I}I < p(n)
The probability in the above te17nS is taken over the internal coin tosses of
algorithms G and E.
This definition says that if we try to construct a polynomial circuit for
distinguishing any given encrypted database table R1 (i.e., the circuit will
output one if the encrypted form belongs to Rb else it will output zero), the
circuit will have a success probability that is at most slightly better than a
random guess.
To clarify the meaning and impact of this definition, we give an example
of a plausible but insecure encryption of a database table.
Example 3.1 Define an encryption scheme for a database as follows: G
randomly outputs a key for a particular block cipher, E encrypts every field
of each tuple with the same key using a block cipher algorithm (e.g., DES),
and D decrypts the every field using the same cipher and key. Even though
the given block cipher algorithm is secure, we can distinguish encryptions of
the following two database tables with probability one. Assume that R 1 and
R2 have a schema (a, b) where both a and b are k bit numbers} and both
have one tuple. If R1 has a tuple (x, x) and R, has a tuple (y, z) (y f z),
a simple (polynomial) circuit that compares the encrypted values of the first
and second fields (E(a) = E(b)) will return true for the encrypted R 1 and
false for the encrypted R2 , distinguishing the two.
3.2 A Secure Method for Encryption of Database Ta-
bles
While one solution to the problem of Example 3.1 is to simply encrypt the
entire database as a single message this would prevent any meaningful query
processing (the entire encrypted database would have to be returned to the
querier to enable decryption). Fortunately, we can use Counter-based CTR
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CTR Attribute 1
Attribute 2 . . .
Counter C EEl E(C) EEl E(C+1)
Figure 1: Encrypted tuple structure
mode to meet Definition 3.1 while still encrypting at the individual fields in
a tuple independently. The idea is that each tuple consists of a counter and
encrypted fields, as described in Section 2. Figure 1 shows an example tuple
encrypted in this manner. Since identical field values will now be xor-ed with
different values, the fact that they are identical (or any other relationship
between them) will be hidden, alleviating the problem of Example 3.1 and
in fact meeting Definition 3.1.
3.3 Database Indistinguishability III the Presence of
Queries
Much of database research has concentrated on efficient processing of queries.
We would like to maintain this efficiency even if the data is encrypted. Prior
proposals for querying encrypted data do not meet Definition 3.1 if an adver-
sary is allowed to view data access patterns; this will be discussed in Section
6. This is not just a problem of poor use of encryption. What we really need
to ensure is that not only is the encrypted database itself secure, but that
the act of processing queries against the database does not reveal informa-
tion. UnfortunatelYl achieving such security is at odds with efficient query
processing. We now give a definition of secure database querying based on
a model from the cryptography community, and show that the only way to
meet this strict definitions is to access the entire database for each query. In
Section 4.1 we will build on these definitions to give a slightly weaker (but
still semantically meaningful) definition supporting more efficient queries. In
our current discussion, we assume that data resides on single server and do
not consider potential gains due to the replicated data.
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3.4 Database Queries as a Special Case of Private In-
formation Retrieval
We now give an alternative definition based on comparison of queries. We
still require that tuples be indistinguishable (Definition 3.1), and also require
that two queries be indistinguishable (e.g., the queries are encrypted). The
idea is that if we can't tell tuples or queries apart, we don't really gain
information from processing the queries. Unfortunately, this leads us to a
result where full table scan is required.
The definition comes from Private Information Retrieval (PIR), which
protect the query from disclosure. The server knows the data, but should
learn nothing about the query.[?] A PIR server must maintain query privacy,
and ensure that the query issuer gets the correct result.
Why do we want the privacy of the user query be protected? The problem
is that if the server knows the query, knowing just the size of the result
reveals information about the database. For example, if server knows that
O"R.al=300(R) returns three tuples, then server will have the knowledge of those
--- tuples' a1 fields. One important thing to note is we should only require query
indistinguishability for queries that have the same result size. Otherwise we
would need to set an upper bound on query result size (the entire database if
we want to support full SQL), and transmit that much data for every query
- the actual result size would distinguish queries.
We now formally define the correctness and the privacy requirements
described above.
Definition 3.2 (Correctness)
Assume database D is stored securely on a server w.r.t Definition 3.1. Let
E(D) be the securely encrypted database and let Q be a query issued on the
database. A query execution is said to be correct if given (Q, E(D))j an
honest seroer provides a result enabling the quell) issuer to learn Q(D).
The correctness definition implies that if the server follows the protocol, the
query issuer will get the correct result.
Privacy must hold even for a dishonest server:
Definition 3.3 (Privacy)
For every query pairQi, Qj that run on the same set of tables over D and have
the same size results, the messages mQ;, mQj sent for executing the queries are
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computationally indistinguishable if for every polynomial-size circuit family
{Cn }, every polynomialp, all sufficiently large n, mQi and mQj E {O, l}poly(n),
1
IPT{Cn(mQ) = I} - PT{Cn(mQ) = I}I < -()
• J P n
The probability in the above terms is taken over the internal coin tosses of
the query issuer and the server.
This privacy definition implies that whatever the server tries to do, it will not
be able to distinguish between two different queries run on the same set of
tables and returning the same size results. For example, if Ql = O"al=300(R)
returns 100 tuples and Q2 = O"al=lOO(R) returns 100 tuples, there is no way
for the server to predict which of the two is executed more effectively than a
random guess.
We can define a secure query execution as one that runs on securely
encrypted data and satisfies Definitions 3.3 and 3.2.
We will show that even for queries that are running on a single table, we
need to scan the entire table.
We first prove that given a set of queries on a particular table with t, if
there exists a query that must access at least v tuples, then we can distinguish
it from a query that occasionally accesses fewer than v tuples. Second, we
show that for any admissible query result size t, there exists a query which
requires the scan of the entire database.
Lemma 3.1 Let St be queries that run on table R with result size t, and
let us assume that there exists a query Q~ that needs to access at least v
tuples for correct evaluation. Let Q~ be an element of St that needs to access
at most v-I tuples with probability greater than p(~). Then there exists
a polynomial-circuit family On that can distinguish them with non-negligible
probability.
PROOF. We define Cn as follows. Given the messages exchanged during
the execution of the query, the circuit will count the number of the tuples
accessed. If it is 2:: v, Cn will output 1; otherwise it will output zero. Note
that On only does a simple counting, therefore is polynomial in terms of
the input size. Now let us calculate the probability P =1 Pr{Cn(mQi) =
I} - PT{Cn(mQ~) = I} I.
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P IPT{C.(mQ~) = I} - PT{C.(mQI) ~ I} I
- 11- PT{Cn(mQ~)~ I} I
11- PT{more than v -1 tnples accessed} I
1




Again, note that the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of
the query issuer and the server; it does not depend on the database values.
Since P is bigger then p(~) we can conclude than en distinguishes the
above queries with non-negligible probability. 0
We now show that the queries needed by the above definition exist.
Lemma 3.2 For any given result size t, there exists a query that needs to
access the entire table.
PROOF. Since the result must be encrypted to preserve security (otherwise
all queries would have to return the same result to avoid being distinguished),
the resulting set size must be a multiple of the cipher block size k of size, up
to the size of the table. Let R have n tuples with u attributes blocked into
u blocks of size k as defined in Section 5.1.1. Here without loss of generality,
we assume that each attribute is k bits long, therefore u is equal to u.
Let assume that id field added to the database is also k bit long. So for
each admissible size t where t is the multiple of k and less than k *n *u, we




U'lrOI (Uid«t mod kJl-l)",a(R)
Uavg("a, (R))
The above query simply gets the average of a single attribute to make
sure that query needs to access the entire table, and pads the result set to
make sure that result size is t. (Since we have not specified a value for k,
this generalizes to any block size, including 1.) 0
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Using the above lemmas, we can now prove the following:
Theorem 3.1 A query execution that is secure in the sense of Definitions
3.3 and 3.2, even for queries known to access a particular database table,
must scan the entire database table non-negligibly often.
PROOF. For the set of queries returning a result of size t, at least one must
require full table access (a construction is given in Lemma 3.2), if not then
not all queries would satisfy the correctness Definition 3.2. We can now build
a distinguisher for any query that requires less than full table access (formal
proof in Lemma 3.1). Since at least one query in t requires full table access,
if any requires less than full access a non-negligible portion of the time,
the distinguisher will be able to tell the two apart. Such a distinguisher
contradicts Definition 3.3. 0
3.5 Database Queries as a Special Case of Software
Protection
More generally, the cryptography community has produced the concept of
oblivious RAM[lO]: a method to obscure the program even to someone watch-
ing the memory access patterns during execution.
In their main result, they show that if a program and its input with total
size y uses memory size m and has a running time t, then it can be simulated
by using m· (log2 m)2 memory in running time O(t(log2 t)3) without revealing
the memory access patterns of the original program (assuming t > y). In
other words, they provide a solution such that the distribution of memory
accesses does not depend on input. This implies that execution of queries
can be made indistinguishable if they access the same number of tuples and
have the same result size.
Unfortunately, even under this relaxation, we will not achieve much im-
provement in terms of efficiency. They show that the lower bound on the
oblivious simulation cost is max{y,'o(tlogt)}. In their model, the input y
includes everything to be protected, including the program and data. The
database would be modeled as part of the program, so the size of the database
and the program will be a lower bound for number of memory access. This
still implies a full table scan. At this point, we would like to stress that we
are considering running a query in isolation - batching queries could improve
throughput (a full scan for each batch), but would prevent effective ad-hoc
or interactive querying.
12
4 Plausible Definition for a Secure Database
Server
In the previous section, we showed that any strict security and privacy re-
quirement force us to scan entire database tables. The previous definitions'
main problems are that they try to preserve indistinguishability even if a
server can look at tuple access patterns. What we need is a definition that
allows revealing the access patterns for a tuple, enabling more efficient query
processing.
4.1 Definition
If the data and queries are encrypted, and the encryption satisfies multiple-
message indistinguishability (e.g., Definition 3.1), then the ability to distin·
guish between queries or tuples carries little information, especially if the
ability to trace tuple access between queries is limited. Using this observa-
tion, we give a new definition that guarantees some level of privacy while
allowing a higher degree of efficiency than the previous examples.
First, we define a minimum set of support tuples for each query: the
tuples that must be accessed to compute the query results. We then only
apply query indistinguishability to queries that have the same support tuple
set.
Definition 4.1 (Min support set)
Let query Q be defined on tables R 1 • R2•...• R.n. Let S be the set of elements
in R 1 x R 2 X ... x R.n. A set S C (R1 X R 2 X ... x R.n) is a min support set
for Q if Q(S) = Q(RI X R, x ... x R,.), and S is the smallest such set for
which this is true.
Example 4.1 Assume we have two tables: Rl(al, 02) = {(I, a), (2, b), (3, c)}
and R,(a1,a2) = {(1,2),(2,3),(3,4)}. Let Q = IIR,.",(O"R,.",~R,",(T)).
Q(R I x R,) return.s the same result as Q({(1, a, 1, 2), (2, b, 2, 3), (3, c, 3, 4)} ),
and these three tuples are the smallest such set.
Using this, we can now give a definition that ensures nothing is disclosed
by watching query processing except the size of the result and what tuples
were processed in arriving at the result.
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Definition 4.2 (Query Indistinguishability)
For every query pair Qi, Qj on the same set of tables, with the same re-
sult size and min support set, the messages mQ;, mQj sent for executing the
queries are computationally indistinguishable if JOT every polynomial-size cir-
cuit family {en}, even) polynomial P, all sufficiently large n, and mQi and
mQj E {a, l}pa/y(n),
1
I Pr{Cn(mQ.) ~ I} - Pr{Cn(mQ,) = I} 1< p(n)
This, combined with Definition 3.1, guarantees that all an adversary can do
is to trace the tuples accessed during query execution, and possibly relate
that to result size. As this could disclose information over the course of many
queries, we also give the following definition, requiring that the confidence in
tracing tuples drops over time:
Definition 4.3 (Three Card Monte Secure)
A database is c-secure if given a query Q with min support set T, the proba-
bility that a server trying to track t E T can do so correctly is < c(k~l) + Ighl'
where k is the numbe1' of times t has been accessed since completion of Q,
The key to this definition is that an adversary's confidence that they know
which tuples Q accessed will decrease over time. (Formal proof of the efficacy
of this definition of security is beyond the scope of this paper.) With high
probability any useful information inferred from tracking tuple access will be
incorrect.
Definition 4.4 We consider a database to support secure query processing
if it meets Definitions 3.1, 3.2, 4.2, and 4·3.
We now describe how to construct a database server meeting these definitions.
4.2 Requirements for a Database Server
Methods that allow equality test of encrypted tuples, or field values in the
tuples, violate Definition 4.4 because tuples can be distinguished. The prob-
lem is that if the tuples are truly indistinguishable, the server will be unable
to do any query processing beyond "send the entire table to the client" - any
meaningful query processing requires distinguishing between tuples, If the
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tuples can be distinguished, then they can be tracked over multiple queries,
disclosing information in violation of Definition 4.3.
However, if we support a few simple operations that are ((hidden" from
the server, we can meet Definition 4.4. The key idea is that operations that
must distinguish between tuples (e.g., comparing a tuple with a selection
criteria) occur by decrypting and evaluating a tuple in a manner invisible
to the server. The tuples accessed are then re-encrypted and written back
to the database, but not necessarily in the same order. This prevents the
server from reliably tracking the tuples accessed across multiple queries. We
don't want to send tuples back to the querier to do this. However, assume
the existence of a module capable of the following:
1. decrypt tuples,
2. perform functions on two tuples,
3. maintain simple (constant-size) history for performing aggregate func-
tions,
4. generate a new tuple as a function of the inputs, and
5. maintain a constant~size store of tuples,
6. perform a countcrwbased CTR mode encryption of the new tuple.
The module may return an (encrypted) tuple to write back into the location
most recently read from - but this is not necessarily the most recently read
tuple (making tracking difficult). (Such swapping was proposed for PIR
in [5], here we amortize the cost as opposed to periodically shuffling off-
line.) It also optionally returns a tuple that becomes part of the result. The
module also returns the address of the next tuple to be retrieved. Assuming
such a module can perform these operations while obscuring its actions and
intermediate results from the server, we can construct a machine meeting
Definition 4.4.
The idea is that the database is encrypted as in Section 3.2. An encrypted
catalog (in a known location) contains pointers to the first tuple in each
table or index. The secure module decrypts the query, reads the catalog
to get the location of the first tuple of the relevant tables/indexes, then
begins processing. We first show how individual relational operations can
be securely performed using the above module. We give a sketch of the
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proof of security of each using a simulation argument (as used in Secure
Multiparty Computation[9)) - the idea is that given the results (min support
set and result size), the server is able to simulate the actions of the secure
module. If it is able to do so, then all queries on that set and result size
must be indistinguishable from the simulator, and thus indistinguishable from
each other. (These are sketches; full details require probabilistic simulation
proofs to meet Definition 4.3.) We will then discuss composing operations to
perform complex queries.
Selection makes use of the fact that we have some memory hidden from
the server (adversary). The secure module keeps the results until the local
memory is partially filled. At this point, after each new tuple is read, one
of the cached result tuples may be output to the server. This decision is a
random choice, with the probability based on the estimated size of the results
relative to the estimated number of tuples read.
Formally, assume that the estimated number of tuples that need to be
read to execute the query is t, the estimated result size is T 1 and the local
memory size is m. The secure module reads the first (tiT) . (m/2) tuples,
caching the results in local memory. At this point, for every tuple read, with
probability rlt one of the cached result tuples is given to the server. When
the query is complete, the remaining cached tuples are given to the server
for delivery to the client.
Theorem 4.1 Provided that queries contributing to the result are (approxi-
mately) uniformly distributed across all tuples read, the above pTOcess meets
Definition 4.4. for full table scan selections.
PROOF SKETCH. Using a simulation argument, we assume the simulator
for the server is given t and r (since these will be known at the end of the
query.) m is publie knowledge. The simulator can thus compute (t/r)·(m/2).
After this many tuples have been read, the simulator begins creating result
tuples. Since the tuples are encrypted using pseudo-random encryption, the
simulator just uses a counter and an appropriate length random string of
bits to simulate a tuple. By arguments on the strength of encryption the
simulated output tuples and re~encrypted tuples are computationally indis-
tinguishable from the real execution. After each tuple is read, a simulated
result tuple is created with probability tiT. When all tuples have been read,
the simulator creates the remaining result tuples (so the total is T.)
Since the result tuples can be simulated using this approach, and the
simulator decides when to create the result tuple in exactly the same fashion
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as the real algorithm decides when to output a result tuple, the simulator
is (computationally) indistinguishable from the actual selection. This shows
that it meets Definition 4.2.
Definition 4.3 is more difficult. This relies on the assumption of approxi-
mately uniform distribution. Because of this, the a-priori probability that a
given tuple is in the first t/r tuples is high, so little information is revealed
by disclosing that the first result occurs in the first (t/T)· (m/2) tuples. D
This approach does fail when the distribution of which tuples contribute
to the result to all query tuples is skewed. For example, if none of the first
(t/T) . (m/2) tuples cause a result tuple to be generated, the algorithm will
be unable to begin outputting result tuples "on schedule". Thus the server
can make an improved estimate of the probability that a tuple contributes
to the result. In the worst case (e.g., only the last r tuples contribute to the
result), this probability approaches l.
Queries that generate most results based only on the first tuples read
are unlikely. Queries that generate results only after reading most or all of
the tuples are more common: aggregation, indexed search. However, these
queries will generally return a small number of results. If r :::; m/2, the secure
coprocessor will not be expected to produce results until all tuples are read,
so Theorem 4.1 holds. Queries where the results are highly skewed should be
processed using an indexed selection anyway (to efficiently access only the
desired tuples.)
Indexed Selection can be done using a method developed for oblivious
access to XML trees[14]. Nodes are swapped, re-encrypted, and written back
to the tree. The key idea is that each time a node is read, c - 1 additional
nodes are read - one of which is known to be empty. All the nodes are re-
encrypted and written, with the target written into the empty node. "When
the nodes are written, the original is written into the empty. This proceeds
in levels: The first two levels are read, the location of the second level empty
is determined, and the parent is updated to point to the previous empty
node, and the first level written. The third level is read, second level parent
updated, etc.
Theorem 4.2 The algorithm of {14! satisfies Definition 4.4.
PROOF SKETCH. Definition 4.2 is satisfied because queries with the same
min support set will follow the same path to the same leaf. The random
choice of c-l addi tionalnodes comes from the same distribution, and are thus
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indistinguishable. Likewise, encryption and rewriting is indistinguishable by
arguments based on strength of encryption.
Definition 4.3 is satisfied because of the swapping. Each time a node is
accessed, it is placed in a new location. However, since c locations have been
read and written, and are indistinguishable to the server, the probability that
the server can pick which of the c locations the node is in is lie.
The next time the node is read, it is again placed in one of e locations,
with which one unknown to the server. The best the server can now do is
guess that it is in one of the 2e locations. (Access to other of the original 2e
locations may confuse the server, causing it to guess more than 2c locations,
but we are guaranteed at least 2c.) This continues, with each access to the
tuple causing an additional c decrease in the server's best guess, giving OUT
l/c(k + 1) target.
The only problem is that the randomly chosen set of "masking" locations
may include locations previously used. This is inherent in a finite database
- the best we can do is 1/IDBI. This is the reasoning behind the ITI/IDBI
"floor" factor in Definition 4.3.
o
This analysis is based on a query returning a single tuple. Extension to range
queries is straightforward.
Projection is straightforward. The comparison function simply returns
E(ll tuple) rather than E(tuple). Knowing the length of a projection from
the encrypted result, the simulator can randomly generate an equivalent-
length string that is computationally indistinguishable from the real en-
crypted result. In particular, note that a "nulr' projection (e.g., "select
* from table") is indistinguishable from any other projection producing tu~
pIes of the same size - the only way to distinguish selection from projection
is the fact that some tuples are "removed" by a selection.
Join can be either repeated full-table scan selection (nested loop join) or
indexed selection (index join). To perform a join, the module first requests a
tuple from one table, then from the second table. Both are decrypted, the join
criteria is checked, and if met the joined tuple is stored for output. Assuming
a reasonably uniform distribution of tuples meeting the join criteria, or a
small number of tuples meeting the join criteria, the proof follows that of
Theorem 4.1. A similar argument holds for an index join. Again, we need
a reasonably uniform distribution of tuples meeting the join criteria. The
18
swapping in the index search prevents too much tracking between tuples,
and caching the results allows the resulting tuples to be output at a constant
rate.
Set operations are straightforward, except for duplicate elimination.
Union is simply two selections. Intersection is a join. Set difference is again
similar to a join, but output only occurs if after completion of a loop (or
index search), a joining tuple is not found.
Duplicate elimination could reveal equality of two tuples. This is more
than simply (ldoes it contribute to the result", and thus violates Definition
4.4. One solution is to replace duplicates with an encrypted dummy tuple.
The client thus gets a correct result by ignoring the dummy tuples, at the
cost of increased size of the result.
4.3 Discussion
Real query processing requires combining these methods to form a query
tree/plan. A simple approach would reveal the query tree and plan to the
server. At first glance, this seems excessive. However, simply given the access
patterns it is often possible to make a good guess as to the query plan: If two
tables are accessed (e.g., tuples of different sizes), it is probably a joinj a table
being accessed and returning fewer tuples is a selection; logarithmic access
frequencies represent a tree-based index. Rather than trying to pretend such
information is hidden, we suggest explicitly revealing it. This allows the
server to perform rule-based query optimization, prefetching, and likely other
types of performance enhancements.
We believe that meaningful improvements in security either require a
query processor that can hide substantial (and non-constant) intermediate
state from the server, or run afoul of the problems of Section 3. Any method
with constant-space (lhidden storage" will either require full table scan for all
queries, or will reveal information equivalent to the above for some sequences
of queries.
5 Architecture for a Secure Database Server
The implementation just described depends on the ability to execute a simple
function on the server, without the server seeing the execution. This problem
is known as program obfuscation, and has been the object of some study. The
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results are not encouraging. General program obfuscation has been shown to
be impossible for large classes of functionalities[6]. While we have not proven
that such an obfuscated program is impossible for our (ldecrypt, compare, and
re-encrypt" function, if possible at all it is likely to pose a high computational
cost.
Fortunately, there is an alternative: tamper-resistant hardware. This en-
ables execution of a function while hiding the execution from the server, as
needed to meet our definition. This has been proposed as a solution to Pri-
vate Information Retrieval[5]; we show how it also applies to general database
query processing. In addition, such hardware already exists. One example
is the IBM 4758 Cryptographic Coprocessor.[12] This is a single-board com-
puter consisting of a CPU, memory and special-purpose cryptographic hard-
ware contained in a tamper-resistant shell; certified to level 4 under FIPS
PUB 140-1. When installed in the server, it is capable of performing 10--
cal computations that are completely hidden from the server; tampering is
detected and clears internal memory.
How does this solve our problem? Using public key cryptography, the
client can verify that the server contains an approved tamper-proof copro--
cessor, and provide the coprocessor with the key for decrypting the tuples in
the database. The client has a key for the coprocessor, allowing it to clear
the coprocessor and load the key and program to be executed. The coproces-
sor can now perform the "decrypt, compare, and re-encrypt" function. Any
attempt by the server to take control of (or tamper with) the coprocessor,
either by software or physically, will clear the coprocessor, thus eliminating
any decrypted view of the tuples. (The same holds true of another client
executing a query; taking control of the coprocessor clears old information.)
Further details on using a tamper-proof coprocessor to securely meet our
requirements are given below.
5.1 ,Considerations for Practical Implementation
Care must be taken to ensure that a tamper-proof coprocessor is in fact used
in a secure way. The basic process of setup for running a query is as follows.
1. The client creates a query execution program that includes the database
key, and encrypts it with the public key of the coprocessor. This query
execution program is fixed, and may be stored at the server (use of a
checksum along with the fact that is encrypted presents the server from
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tampering with the program.)
2. The client creates a query (including a checksum to prevent tamper-
ing), encrypts with the database key stored in the (encrypted) query
execution program, and sends it to the server.
3. The server delivers the query execution program to the secure copro-
cessor, and instructs it to reset, then decrypts the program with its
private key and executes it. This particular private key can only be
used as part of such a "reset, decrypt I and load" command, ensuring
that the database key cannot be decrypted unless the accompanying
program for query execution is run.
4. The server provides the query to the coprocessor, which decrypts it and
verifies the checksum.
5. The coprocessor now begins requesting tuples from the server. As each
is received, it is decrypted, compared with appropriate query terms,
and any result is re-encrypted before being returned to the server (as
described in Section 4.2).
'-6. On query completion, the co-processor sends a "done" message to the
server and resets (clearing its memory.)
7. The server returns the results to the client, which decrypts them with
its database key.
The key to the security of this protocol is that the server never sees the
key used to encrypt the database / queries, or any data that is not encrypted
with that key. The database key is stored in two places: At the client!; and
at the server, but encrypted with the coprocessor's public key. The only
way the server-stored key can be decrypted is after resetting the coprocessor,
and while executing the (client-provided and verified) program that executes
queries. Thus the database key is only accessible to code provided by the
client, running in an environment that is not visible to the server.
While the secure coprocessor is somewhat at the mercy of the server, the
only way the server can modify the code executed by the coprocessor is by
resetting and reloading the code, which clears the coprocessor (including the
IThe client is presumed to be trusted. In practice, key management could be handled
with a secure subsystem such as the Trusted Computing Group chip[17].
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al I a2 1 a3
bl I b2 I b3
cl , c2 , c3
Table 1, Original Table
database key.) Any attempt to modify the encrypted code will prevent vali-
dation of the code, and the coprocessor will refuse to run the code. Thus the
coprocessor can be guaranteed to securely provide the functionality required
in Section 4.2.
Note that there is nothing to prevent multiple clients from sharing the
same server; the only limitation is that only one may use the secure coproces-
sor at any given time. This poses some interesting challenges for concurrency
control, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.
The tamper-proof hardware solution has other advantages. Since secure
coprocessors are typically designed for use in setting where data is encrypted,
they will typically contain special-purpose encryption/decryption hardware,
providing improved performance. For example, the IBM 4758 includes hard-
ware support for DES, modular math to support public-key encryption, and
random number generation. Raw throughput can achieve 23.5MB/sec for
DES.
5.1.1 Encryption Optimizations
In practical terms, each encrypted value needs to be of the given block ci-
pher size. We can easily combine, split, or pad attributes to achieve this,
depending on our requirements. For example, if the each attribute is 32 bits
long and cipher operates on 64 bits blocks, we can encrypt them pair by pair
and pad the last block with zeros. Let u be the minimum number of blocks
needed to encrypt each tuple. We encrypt the i th tuple's jth block Bij as
E]«(i *u + j) EIl Bij, where K is the encryption key.
Since tuples will be processed alone, we will add a new field to store i *u
in every tuple. For example, given the original database Table 1 where each
attribute is 32 bits, the encrypted table using a 64-bit block cipher is shown
in Table 2. 0 denotes the concatenation operation and 032 denotes a 32 bit
string of all zeros.
It is clear from the example that given the key, we can decrypt any part of
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0, EK(O) ED (bl 0 b2),
2, EK (2) ED (el 0 c2),
4, EK (4) ED (al 0 a2),
EK(l) ED (032 0 b3)
EK (3) ED (0" 0 c3)
E j «(5) ED (032 0 a3)
Table 2, Encrypted Table
the table independently. Another advantage is that we can decrypt counters
in advance: assigning the counters in order is not a problem (they just need to
be unique), so it may be possible to guess (and decrypt) counters in parallel
with a block of tuples being retrieved from disk.
It has been suggested that decrypting data as part of a query would pose
an unreasonable cost[15]. Based on benchmarks published by IBM[13], sim-
ple decryption of a single tuple would take several milliseconds. In practice,
a system would probably encrypt/decrypt at the page rather than tuple level
(assuming sufficient internal memory). The re-encryption/swapping would
then also occur at the page level. In addition, the decryption of CTR counters
can be done even before tuples are read, leaving only a simple xor operation
for each tuple. Given this, we believe it is feasible to implement decryp-
~ion/encryption of the CTR counters at speeds that approaches the peak
23.5MB/sec DES throughput achieved by the IBM 4758, and the xor oper-
ation would not introduce a significant delay. This approaches disk speeds,
allowing a secure database server without a significant performance penalty.
6 Prior work in Secure DBMS Servers
There have been several efforts to develop systems for managing encrypted
data. In [4], Ahituv, Lapid, and Neumann addressed the problem of man-
aging updates (but not queries) on encrypted data. They require that which
tuple is to be updated be known, but the value in that tuple is secret. They
developed a method for additive updates in two cases: One where the value
to be added is known to the server, and one where both are unknown. Their
approach is based on homomorphic encryption, E(a+b) = E(a)+ E(b). The
idea is that using homomorphic encryption, we don't need to decrypt values
to add them.
The issue of indexing encrypted data is addressed in [11]. The key idea is
that values are partitioned into buckets. A query is translated into operations
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on these buckets; the server returns all results from the appropriate buckets.
One problem with this technique is that buckets must be of a fixed size to
avoid violating Definition 3.1 even in the absence of queries. While feasible
for an initial database, maintaining this after insertions is not feasible. Thus
the relative size of buckets reveals information about the distribution of the
data. A second problem is that relationships between fields in a tuple are
revealed, as in Example 3.1. Only probabilistic relationships are learned, but
as the bucket size decreases the probability of learning such a relationship
increases. Large buckets are not a feasible solution, as an equ-join becomes
a cross-product of buckets, with the result size (and client effort) growing
rapidly with larger buckets (as shown in [11]).
Ozsoyoglu et al. [15] also addressed running queries on encrypted databases.
They suggest heuristic encryption methods that preserve some relationships
among the data, such as order or the difference between attributes. Such or-
der preserving encryption functions cannot satisfy database indistinguisha-
bility (Definition 3.1). Consider databases with two attributes and n tu-
ples. The first database contains tuples < 1,1 >, < 2,2 >, ... , the second
< 1, n >, < 2, n - 1 >, .... If the encryption preserves order, we can always
distinguish between the two sequences with probability 1, as the tuples sort
the same on both attributes in database 1, and sort in opposite order on the
two attributes in database 2. Similar arguments can be used for encryption
that preserves difference between the messages. \iVhile data values may be
protected from direct inspection, a determined server with some additional
knowledge (e.g., a history of queries) may be able to significantly compromise
security.
Careful definitions of the system environment can be secure using these
methods. A method for order-preserving encryption that hides distributions,
and an architecture for its use, is presented in [3]. The key is in their as-
sumptions: The database software is trusted (the adversary only has access
to the encrypted database, not the running system), and only one attribute
in each relation uses order-preserving encryption. While secure within the
assumptions, it does not meet our goal of a "secure database service'} .
A key distinction between our work and that described above is that we
address what the server learns from processing queries. Statistical database
work has shown that a sequence of queries can reveal information beyond that
revealed by any single query[I]; this is just as true for queries on encrypted
data. Private Information Retrieval has addressed this issue [7], but under
the assumption that the data is known to the server and the query must be
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kept private. The results are discouraging; the data access lower bound for
single server is the entire database. However, by encrypting both data and
queries, we can obtain reasonable levels of security and avoid the impossibility
results of Private Information Retrieval.
7 Conclusions
The idea of a database server operating on encrypted data is a nice one: It
opens up new business models, protects against unauthorized access, allows
remote database services, etc. Achieving this vision requires compromises
between security and efficiency. We have shown that a server that would
be considered secure by the cryptography community would be hopelessly
inefficient by standards of the database community. Efficient methods (e.g.,
operations on encrypted data) can not meet cryptographic standards of se-
curity.
We have given a definition of security that is the best that can be achieved
while maintaining reasonable levels of performance. We have shown that
this definition can be realized using commercially available special-purpose
hardware.
This definition and approach raises many questions. The first is real-
world performance: What happens if we implement such a system? We
plan to pursue such an implementation. This will lead to many challenges:
More efficient join and indexing strategies that meet security requirements,
concurrency control that does not violate security, query optimization ap-
proaches, etc. A second issue is when the security offered by Definition 4.4 is
inadequate, and only (inefficient) approaches meeting Definitions 3.2-3.3 are
adequate. While we have shown that our approach is the best we can (effi-
ciently) do, the disclosures may be too much for some applications. Progress
in this area will require better definitions of security; e.g., privacy definitions
as rigorous as the security definitions that enabled progress in multilevel
secure databases[16].
In spite of these questions, a database server managing encrypted data is
feasible. Such a server will provide substantial benefit, such as easing enforce-
ment of several of the ten principles proposed for a Hippocratic Database
system[2]. With careful and rigorous work on ensuring that security is
achieved, we can expect to see significant progress in this area. Key areas
for future work are:
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• Formal proof that Definition 4.3 adequately protects against inference
from tracking qnery accesses,
• Formal proof that the Definitions given are complete and consistent,
• Methods for proving that query processing algorithms meet security
definitions,
• Query optimization methods that provide provably secure means of
combining the various component algorithms,
• Practical efficiency issues: query and data pipelining in conjunction
with encryption (this will demand implementation on real hardware),
and
• System issues: How does this play out in real-world applications?
We believe a new and important research direction is taking off; this paper
shows how with careful definition of what it means to be secure, such research
can ensure the promised security while achieving practical efficiency.
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